Avraham Yitzhaq Ha-Cohen Kook (1865-1935) stands as a colossal figure of modern Jewish history and thought. Jurist, mystic, poet, theologian, communal leader, founder of the modern Chief Rabbinate and still the defining thinker of Religious Zionism, he is indispensable for understanding modern Jewish thought, the contemporary State of Israel, and the most fundamental interactions of religion, nationalism, ethics and spirituality. Despite countless studies of him, almost no full-fledged intellectual biography of him exists in any language. This study of the (...) years before his momentous move to Jaffa in 1904, drawing on little-known works, including recently published manuscripts, begins to fill that gap. It traces his life and times in the remarkably intense Rabbinic intellectual milieu of late nineteenth-century Eastern Europe, and his path from a profound, regularly rationalist traditionalism, towards a dynamic theology and spiritual practice weaving together Kabbalah, philosophy, universal ethics, and romantic mysticism. (shrink)

Avraham Yitzhaq Ha-Cohen Kook (1865-1935) stands as a colossal figure of modern Jewish history and thought. Jurist, mystic, poet, theologian, communal leader, founder of the modern Chief Rabbinate and still the defining thinker of Religious Zionism, he is indispensable for understanding modern Jewish thought, the contemporary State of Israel, and the most fundamental interactions of religion, nationalism, ethics and spirituality. Despite countless studies of him, almost no full-fledged intellectual biography of him exists in any language. This study of the (...) years before his momentous move to Jaffa in 1904, drawing on little-known works, including recently published manuscripts, begins to fill that gap. It traces his life and times in the remarkably intense Rabbinic intellectual milieu of late nineteenth-century Eastern Europe, and his path from a profound, regularly rationalist traditionalism, towards a dynamic theology and spiritual practice weaving together Kabbalah, philosophy, universal ethics, and romantic mysticism. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 24, Issue 2, pp 300 - 317 This article examines R. Zvi Yehudah Kook’s reading of two earlier thinkers who were influential in the formulation of his thought—the Maharal of Prague and R. Avraham Azulai. I argue that his creative and unique reading of these texts exemplifies a fascinating dialogue he held with earlier sources, which he interpreted and infused with his own theological postulates. Here I explore his theory of the unique nature of the (...) Jewish soul, in both its collective and individual manifestations. The connection between R. Zvi Yehudah’s approach to interpreting earlier Jewish theological texts and that of his father, R. Avraham Itzhak HaCohen Kook, will also be discussed. (shrink)

ḥeleḳ 1. - Elul, Tishre - Adar -- ḥeleḳ 2. Nisan-Av.

Śiḥot maran ha-Mashgiaḥ Mohari Leṿinshṭain, zatsal -- Ḥidushe torato ʻa. Mas. B.ḳ. ṿe-liḳuṭim -- Leḳeṭ mi-maʼamraṿ mi-moreshet Daṿid Heber ṿe-ʻinyene ha-shaʻah.

We consider the mind-dependence or independence of the "now," of "becoming," and of "time's arrow," by considering the various senses in which these notions might be mind-dependent or not. These matters cannot be sensibly discussed without taking a stand regarding criteria of "reality." Proceeding from a basically phenomenalist position we conclude that merely to differentiate between appearance and reality is implicitly to assume a directed flow of time. We discuss the relationship between phenomenological and physical time and their possible asymmetries. (...) We find that physical time acquires meaning only through phenomenological time, and that phenomenological time is fundamentally asymmetric. This still leaves room for the question: Is there anything in physical time which reflects the fact that it, to be meaningful, must be applied asymmetrically? The relevance of relativity theory to this question is discussed. (shrink)

In this essay I will argue for the existence of a Bolshevik Center, which coordinated the activities of the Bolsheviks in the Russian Social Democratic Party. This Bolshevik Center was dissolved in an intra-Bolshevik factional dispute on the eve of Lenin''s writing hisMaterialism and Empirio-Criticism. The source of the conflict in the Bolshevik Center related to disagreements over Lenin''s tactics following the 1905 revolution. The leader of the anti-Lenin opposition was Bogdanov. But the struggle over tactics could not be contained (...) in the political sphere; it spilled over to the philosophical. Lenin''sMaterialism and Empirio-Criticism was written as a refutation of Bogdanov''s philosophical thought in an attempt to drive him out of the Party. This essay will trace the events which led to the dissolution of the Bolshevik Center.In order to be able to follow the tactical debates a definition of terms to be used throughout this paper would be helpful. In terms of the strategic problems facing the Bolsheviks, as well as members of the Russian Social-Democratic Party (RSDP), in their attitude to theDuma, the word Boycott will refer to those who argued that the Bolsheviks should not participate in theDuma in any capacity. TheBoycottists maintained that the Bolsheviks should not even participate in the elections to theDuma. The wordUltimatism refers to those among the Bolsheviks who wished to participate in the ThirdDuma, but who favored the total obedience of the Russian Social-Democrats who might be elected to theDuma to the Central Committee of the Party.Ultimatism refers to the control and hegemony of the Central Committee over any social-democratic delegates who might win elections to the Third Duma.Otzovism means removing. TheOtzovists were those among the Bolsheviks, who advocated the removal of any social-democratic delegate in the ThirdDuma who disobeyed the directives of the Party Central Committee. Ultimatism andOtzovism concerned questions of Party authority. The Otzovist recommended the expulsion of any delegate in the Duma who abrogated the authority of the Party organs.Boycottism did not deal with questions of Party authority as such, but rather was fundamentally a tactical question: participation or non-participation in theDuma, e.g. parliamentarism vs revolution. (shrink)

We rebut the objections to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics presented by Park [9,10], Margenau [10], and Popper [11]. It seems to us that these authors, having adopted different interpretations of quantum mechanics, have been unable to grasp the perspective of the Copenhagenist. They therefore miss the points which the Copenhagenist is making when he: accords a special status to observations in quantum theory; attributes a state vector to an individual system; places restrictions on the simultaneous measurability of non-commuting (...) observables; hesitates to use his measurements for retrodictions. In our opinion, the arguments of the above authors reflect their incomprehension of Copenhagenism. Elsewhere [5,6] we have discussed two alternative interpretations of quantum mechanics which we have called Copenhagenism and Popperism. We have there shown how the dispute between the schools stems from disparate uses of the word ‘state’. We continue the discussion here within the context of the above points and show how these disparate notions of state are related to diverse notions of ‘behaviour’. (shrink)

Is the Copenhagen interpretation really a subjective one? What is the special role that observations play in quantum theory? Is there really something peculiar about the projection postulate? Why does the Copenhagenist treat probabilities as properties of individual systems? Is there a measurement problem, and if so, can itin principle be solved within the framework of quantum theory? We offer aconceptual treatment of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics in which these questions are answered and contrast it with another interpretation (...) which we call Popperism. The interpretations differ in their choice of a state description, from which it follows that they will offer a different account of the relation of measurements to states and different ways of describing quantum theory. But the two descriptions are equally consistent and physically completely equivalent. (shrink)

In a Recent article [9], Alexander Rosenberg attacks the “manipulative” view of causation as being unilluminating and as being beset with difficulties. As a proponent of that view [3], I have felt it necessary to take up cudgels in its defence.Rosenberg's criticisms are directed at Gasking's version of this view [5]. Gasking's recipe for causation is, “one says ‘A causes B’ in cases where one could produce an event of the A sort as a means to producing one of the (...) B sort”. Here it is taken for granted that we have general manipulative techniques for producing events of the A sort and that this is implicitly assumed when one speaks of A as a cause. There is one qualification to this formula for causes which arises from the necessity for individuating processes, namely, that, for A to be the cause of B, it must not always lead to B, but only in special cases. (shrink)

Some aspects of the problem of measurement in quantum theory are treated. We stress that the problem is both physical and conceptual, that the physical problem has been solved and the conceptual one is inherent in quantum theory. We also deal with some remarks made by Wigner concerning physics and the explanation of life, and present alternative positions on the mind-matter relationship within a deterministic framework, as we see them.

The class of stable posets is defined and investigated. We give a forcing construction of a universe of set theory which satisfies a weak form of Martin's Axiom and $2^{\aleph_0} > \aleph_1$ and yet some propositions which follow from CH hold in this universe.

Traumatic brain injury (TBI) is a major cause of death and disability in Western society, and often results in functional and neuropsychological abnormalities. Memory impairment is one of the most significant cognitive implications after TBI. In the current study we investigated procedural memory acquisition by observational training in TBI patients. It was previously found that while practicing a new motor skill, patients engage in all three phases of skill learning–fast acquisition, between-session consolidation, and long-term retention, though their pattern of learning (...) is atypical compared to healthy participants. A different set of studies showed that training by observing a motor task, generally prompted effective acquisition and consolidation of procedural knowledge in healthy participants. The aim of our study was to (i) evaluate the potential benefit of action observation in TBI patients. (ii) Examine the possibility of general improvement in performance between the first (24 h post-training) and second (2 weeks post-training) stage of the study. (iii) Investigate the link between patients’ ability to benefit from observational learning (viaperformance gains–speed and accuracy) and common measures of injury (such as severity of injury, functional and cognitive measures).Materials and methodsPatients hospitalized after moderate to severe TBI, were trained by observation for the finger opposition sequence (FOS) motor task. They were then tested for the observation-trained sequence (A) and a similar control sequence (B), at two different time-points (24 h post-training and 2 weeks later).Results revealed(i) a significant difference in performance between the trained (A) and untrained (B) sequences, in favor of the trained sequence. (ii) An increase in performance for both sequences A and B toward the second (retention) session. (iii) The advantage for sequence A was stable and preserved also in the second session. (iv) Participants with lower moderate Functional Independence Measure (FIM) scores gained more from observational-procedural learning, compared with patients with higher functional abilities.ConclusionOverall, these findings support the notion that TBI patients may achieve procedural memory consolidation and retention through observational learning. Moreover, different functional traits may predict the outcomes of observational training in different patients. These findings may have significant practical implications in the future, regarding skill acquisition methods in TBI patients. (shrink)

The “Assyrian Century,” the period of Assyrian rule in the Levant, is usually regarded as an era of prosperity and economic progress. As far as the southern Levant is concerned, this reconstruction more or less reflects the reality on the southern edge of the region—in the areas of Philistia, Judah, and Edom. But what was the situation in the northern part of the country, in the territories of the former kingdom of Israel and adjacent territories, regions that had become Assyrian (...) provinces? It is the aim of this paper to scrutinize the archaeological data from these regions in order to shed light on the settlement and demographic reality in those provinces, and furthermore to reassess Assyrian policy in the west. After summarizing previous research, the article will present the available archaeological data, which will then be compared with that from the southern part of the country in order to enable a reexamination of the Assyrian empire’s policy in the west. (shrink)

The article examines the relation between two kinds of ontological relations that hold together the building blocks of Spinoza’s metaphysics: “being in” and “affection of.” It argues that in order to speak of existence in a single sense, Spinoza equivocates on the notion of affection. On the one hand, substance is in itself in the same sense that every other existing thing is in substance. On the other hand, substance is not the affections of itself, affections of substance are not (...) related to substance in the same sense that affections of modes are related to modes, and affections of modes, which are affections of affections of substance, cannot, at least in some cases, be regarded as affections of substance. Thus, although “God is without passions,” the passions themselves exist in the same sense that God, human beings, and other modes exist, that is, in the sense that they are all in nature; but while the meaning of “being” remains the same, the meaning of “being affected,” or “feeling,” necessarily changes as the Ethics unfolds. (shrink)

ha-Derekh la-ʻaliyah -- Bi-shevile ha-ʻavodah -- Dorshe H.